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Book Note
LAW AS ENGINEERING: THINKING ABOUT WHAT LAWYERS
DO, by David Howarth 1
DANIELLE CORNACCHIA
WOULD IT BE ACCURATE, OR CONSTRUCTIVE, to describe what lawyers do as

engineering? David Howarth’s response is a fervent “yes” in Law as Engineering.
The author sketches the ethical implications for legal professionals of thinking and
acting like professional engineers. Howarth argues that, whereas engineers take
seriously the societal consequences of their work, lawyers incompletely theorize
the potential consequences of their “devices” (e.g., contracts, wills, corporations)
and that this tendency needs to change. The shortsighted lawyers should adopt
the engineers’ broad-minded professional touch.
Howarth weaves together seminal issues and case studies in both legal and
engineering ethics to arrive at preliminary best practices for lawyers wishing to
avoid contributing to such large-scale disasters as the collapse of the world’s
financial markets (e.g., the Great Crash of 2008). The book’s six chapters are
introduced in chapter one, which includes a thorough literature review of
relevant scholarship.2 The definition of what lawyers do is fleshed out in chapter
two, where the author focuses on transactional work. Although the book concerns
only two professional contexts—England and the United States—it could easily be
of interest to lawyers working in other Commonwealth jurisdictions.
Howarth introduces chapter three (Law as Engineering) by defining what
engineers do and how they go about doing it. Unlike lawyers, engineers describe
their design processes in terms of systems; this enables them to specify and to
test design outcomes at various system levels. With this definition in mind,
the author introduces the concept of law-as-engineering, observing that, like

1.
2.

(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2013) 237 pages.
See e.g. Roscoe Pound, Social Control Through Law (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1942), cited in ibid at 6, n 13.
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engineers, “lawyers want to make something useful that works for their clients.”3
But, he acknowledges, “[t]he uncertainties involved for transactions lawyers
in assessing risks at system levels beyond the law are considerable.”4 Chapters
four and five take the law-as-engineering analogy further, exploring its ethical
implications for transactional lawyers, litigators, judges, and legal academics.
In chapter four, Howarth walks the reader through lawyers’ roles in the Great
Crash using two case studies—the fall of Lehman Brothers and the controversial
activities of Goldman Sachs. He is not convinced, for example, that the lawyers
at the London office of Linklaters, an English law firm, who helped justify
Lehman Brothers’s infamous Repo 105 transactions should see themselves as one or
more system-levels removed from an ethical responsibility to prevent such specious
dealings. To be clear, Howarth does not allege that the lawyers engaged in fraudulent
undertakings. Instead, he uses these examples as a basis for speculating on the
limits of lawyers’ professional obligations. He asks, for example, “Do lawyers
have an obligation to preserve the stability of markets… ?”5 And, although he
never quite answers that or many questions like it, Howarth does make a case
for minimizing specialization-based scapegoating (e.g., blaming the accountants,
not the lawyers). The kernel of Howarth’s response is informed by two arguments
from engineering ethics against technological neutrality, which he extrapolates to
legal technology (e.g., Repos).
Chapter five is where Howarth outlines the implications of law-as-engineering
for legal research and teaching. In chapter six, the reader is asked, once more, to
consider the issue that unifies chapters one through four—why lawyers should be
described as engineers. Howarth reiterates that this description “is useful because
it provides a sound starting point for appraising what lawyers do, through the
application of engineering ethics to their activities, and for improving their
performance, through searching for principles of effective design.”6 He dedicates
the remainder of his concluding chapter to responding to four objections to
this position.
The resulting ethical framework appears to be a unique blend of instrumentalism
and consequentialism, although Howarth never describes it as such. Whether or not
readers will agree with the author’s theoretical product, they will surely admire his
ability to tackle provocative and timely questions in a well-mannered tone. Written
3.
4.
5.
6.

Ibid at 67.
Ibid at 82.
Ibid at 108.
Ibid at 189.
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in accessible prose, Law as Engineering should appeal to a general audience of legal
scholars, practitioners, and law students seeking a renewed engagement with
foundational questions of legal practice.

